F-106 #59-022, Raymond, Washington, October 3, 1967

(Photo of #59-022, from Marty Isham Collection via http://www.f-106deltadart.com [I shamelessly heisted it, but you should definitely stop by this site, since they are the penultimate experts on all things F-106!])

The F-106 was a wonderful craft. It could dog-fight. It could go supersonic and reach incredible altitudes. It was equipped with the amazing MA-1 fire control system, which, hooked into the SAGE network could guide it to a target and fire its weapons almost completely automatically. In its almost 40 years, it had the best safety record of all Air Force single engine aircraft, still, of the 340 aircraft built, 112 were lost in operational accidents, either on the ground or in the air.

In the late 1960s, the F-106 fleet had been selected to be modified with Supersonic external fuel tanks and in-flight refueling equipment. This was begun in 1967. The first of the sixes to obtain these modifications were Washington State based sixes. On October 3, 1967, F-106A, #59-022 was scheduled for a functional test flight after having these modifications.

Major Richard S. Petersen was assigned. He filed a DD form 175 (IFR flight plan, or Instrument Flight Rules[indicates he would be using instruments and electronic means to fly the aircraft, usually used in poor weather, rather than visual flight rules used in clear air]) at the Base Operations as LK 19 (Lima Kilo 19). The estimated departure time was 1700Z, or 1000 local, for an hour and 15 minute test hop. He began his weather briefing at about a quarter to 0845 (1545z). The weather at McChord was 1000 feet scattered, 4500 scattered, and 7000 broken, with 15 miles visibility. Forecast was 800 broken, 4000 broken, and 7000 overcast with visibilty at 7 miles with light rain. He got a weather waiver from the deputy commander for flight operations (This indicates that it probably wasn't a big deal to fly in weather, since the waiver was given). Clearance was filed at 1556Z (0856 PST), a little over an hour ahead of scheduled departure.

Petersen went to the Fighter Squadron, donned his flight gear and proceeded to the flight line. He did his walk around and began his preflight. After engine start, though, he told the crew chief that the attitude director indicator (ADI) would not erect properly. An instrument technician was sent to the aircraft. He replaced the ADI power supply. Satisfied with the aircraft, the pilot taxied out and began his check lists, now 46 minutes behind schedule (1046).

Lima Kilo 19 was cleared to flight level 360, or 36,000 feet. departure instructions were to turn right to a heading of 288 and maintain 4000 feet until he was 7 miles west. When he reached this point he was cleared by RAPCON to climb to his assigned altitude. He was handed of to Seattle Center and then to ADC Control (landferry) when he was appoximatel;y 20 nautical miles south of Neah Bay for flight monitoring. Landferry cleared LK 19 for his supersonic run on a heading of 150, parallel to the shore, but at 20 miles out.

Lima Kilo 19 requested a 75 mile extension to his supersonic leg. When asked, he reported that his speed was mach 1.3 at 40,000 feet. At 1116 local, Lima Kilo 19 reported that he could not obtain mach and requested a recovery vector. The vector given was 040. He was cleared to descend to FL310 when he requested it. Seattle Center assumed control at 1122 and cleared LK19 to descend to 5000 feet.

At 1122:11 Petersen acknowledged the descent and reported out of 31000. Seven seconds later he told Seattle Center that he, "Would like a minimum of turns on the letdown 'til I can go VFR. I've lost my flight instruments, ..uh..attitude indicator tape." (most F-106s were equipped with vertical tape instruments that were supposed to be easier to read than traditional circular types. Supposed;y they could give more information faster than the traditional type) Two minutes later Petersen advised Seattle Center that he had, "lost all flight instruments of...sh...in a descent at this time--and I'd sorta like to bail out of this thing." The time was 1124:55. This was the last transmission that Lima Kilo 19 made.

Radar plots indicated that he was making a right turn from an Easterly heading to a Westerly heading. The aircraft crashed in an open field in a very steep attitude, the accident report estimated it at 60 degrees nose down. The final heading, on impact was turning right at 061 degrees, putting it on a South West track at that time. Major Petersen did eject, but unsuccessfully. The Canopy, the seat, and his body was discovered about 1/3 of a mile to the Southwest on a hill about 300 feet about the aircraft. The aircraft hit near Raymond Washington.

The weather was mostly cloudy if one reads the forecast correctly. Given the fact that he was cleared for Instrument Flight Rules, and his wish to obtain Visual Flight Rules conditions, it seems likely that his instruments were either giving him faulty or no reading at all. In that sort of environment, there is no horizon to gage attitude by. The motion of the aircraft is enough to over-ride the human cochlea and it is easy to think you are going in the right direction when you are not. Major Petersen seemed completely aware of this and was quite ready to depart the aircraft when his instruments began to go south.

Early F-106 ejection seats were notorious for poor performance. The early seats had been replaced by the "B" seat and finally by the "Zero-Zero" seat. This meant that it could safely take its occupant away from the airframe at Zero Altitude and Zero Speed. By 1967 most of the kinks had been worked out and the "Zero-Zero" seat had been fitted to the entire fleet.

It would appear that bad luck had been a large factor in Major Petersen's demise. First, bad luck that his instruments failed TWICE. Then that he was unable to complete his entire mach run. And, when his instruments failed a second time, his aircraft was in "the soup" (or bad weather) and he could not visually determine the attitude of his aircraft to bring it in safely. Finally, when he DID eject, something (and this accident report fails to identify what) caused him to sustain injuries that killed him.

The Convair F-106 Delta Dart was the interceptor that kept American skies clear of Communist aggressors for almost 40 years. It served with distinction, but never fired a shot in anger. After it was retired the majority of the survivors suffered the semi-inglorious fate of being used as targets. Some defend this as the most noble end for a FIGHTER, they consider it a better fate than sitting on a pole. Others may be saddened that a jet that kept America safe for so long suffered such an indignity. Either way, the SIX was a fighter no matter which side you land on. There are enough that remain today on display that most people will be able to see one in person if they don't mind a short drive.

Sources:

Accident report for #59-022 obtained from USAF.

F-106 Delta Dart.com http://www.f-106deltadart.com/history.htm

F-106A #59-142

During the Cold War, as I've written, there were, in a few places in Washington, Air Bases with interceptor squadrons assigned. A standard thing to do in the military is to train until an action becomes automatic. These interceptor squadrons were here for a few reasons. One was the presence of several War-Making industries (i.e., Hanford, Boeing, a few large naval bases, and any number of raw materials, like aluminum, wood products, and so on), the other was Washington's geographical placement. Washington is the first state on a route from the Soviet Union to other points in the USA (We don't claim singular status there, but you would get to us before you got to, say, Nevada on a flight from the Soviet Union).

Early training for interceptors usually involved a friendly bomber training for their own mission and the interceptor training for his and the two meeting up at some point. Ground control would vector the interceptor to a point where either the interceptor pilot (F-51s) or his on-board radar (F-94s,F-86s, F-89s, and finally F-106s) could track the incoming bomber on his own. Well, sometime in the late 1950s someone in the USAF decided to begin using the Martin B-57 Canberra to test the air defenses of the US. They decided to use the B-57 because of its size, range, speed, and altitude capability.

The B-57 did this, at first, without any special additions. No electronic gadgets or anything. But, as the interceptors got better at their jobs, the USAF decided to modify several RB-57As (R standing for reconnaissance)to do the job better. They added several black boxes and chaff dispensers and viola! they had a good target. These became part of Defense System Evaluation Squadrons. Eventually, though, B-57Bs and B-57Es were also modified accordingly. The EB-57s were used for many years to test the air defenses of the US. In fact, the last of the type to operate for the USAF were EB-57s, the last of which were retired in 1982.

The F-106 was basically an F-102 up-engined and integrated with a fire control system. The external differences between the two are easy for most to discern. The F-106's air intakes were moved behind the cockpit and the vertical stabilizer was chopped off compared to the F-102's. The first F-106 rolled off the assembly line in 1956. The last one was retired in 1988! Relatively unheard of, as compared to siblings like the F-104 and F-105, it stood guard at home while the others went off to war in Vietnam. Though, it did deploy to forward bases like Korea and Labrador (Though, one wonders how a TDY to Labrador, Canada compared to one to Korea).

Sometime during the afternoon of August 27, 1963, First Lieutenant Roger C. Axlund of the 498th FIS, began his flight planning routine for a night ECM/ECCM intercept training mission against an EB-57E (According to the accident report, it was a TB-57E, though the B-57 did not have a training variant. The B-57E had dual controls and was sometimes used for training and was hence designated a TB-57 in those instances. And some referred to it as a TB-57 at all times. Because it was being used as a defense system evaluator, it will be referred to as an EB-57 here.) temporarily deployed to McChord AFB, Washington from Hill AFB, Utah.

Lieutenant Axlund would likely have been taken out to his aircraft about an hour before launch. He was assigned to F-106A #59-142 and took off at 0005 on August 28, 1963, with two+ hours worth of fuel. The EB-57 had departed McChord AFB at five minutes before midnight with 4+ hours of fuel.

SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, a kind of Air Defense Ground Control) conducted the approach. Both the B-57 and the F-106 (Six) were in contact with the SAGE controller. The B-57 was communicating with voice comm, while the six was using a data-link (only mandatory safety and intercept calls were made by voice). Weather was clear, visibility was six miles in smoke.

The mission had been fully briefed between the crews of the Sixes and the B-57, since the ECM equipment in the EB-57 was new to the ADC training inventory. The B-57 turned on all of its jammers (four in number) until one of the generators failed, so the crew turned off the forward two jammers. This would be no problem since all of the attacks were expected to be from the aft quarters. There were two F-106s up conducting intercepts, alternating attacks. The B-57 maintained 250 KIAS (Knots Indicated Air Speed) and headings as directed by the SAGE controller.

Axlund called two successful attacks to the SAGE controller, even though there was non-standard language used. Axlund had reported no malfunctions or deficiencies. He made another visual contact on the B-57 and called separation on and visual contact with the other F-106. He then called a lock-on to the ECM jamming source. He en continued to attack the ECM Jamming source and collided with the B-57. The six's vertical stabilizer hit the B-57's number one engine (Left) and the six continued on from under the B-57's wing. The top 52 inches of the vetical stabilizer separated from the F-106.

The B-57 reported the collision to the SAGE controller and turned back toward McChord, about 95 miles East. The collision occurred at 0109 local, at 47 degrees 43 minutes N. , 124 degrees 45 minutes West. This was approximately 15 miles off shore, due West of Destruction Island, Washington.

Axlund was observed flying straight and level for about a mile, when he began a gentle left turn. He did not transmit after he reported the ECM lock-on. About three minutes prior to the collision. The UHF antenna was destroyed in the collision. The other F-106 had Axlund in sight and watched him begin and accelerated descent, seemingly stabilized on a heading toward shore. Axlund's aircraft began to pitch down and increased speed, in the opinion of the Six observing him, into the trans-sonic region. Somewhere under 20,000 feet, the observer saw a flash from Axlund's aircraft, which he took to be an ejection. Immediately after that, he lost radar an visual contact with Axlund's plane.

The B-57 returned to McChord safely. The crew was uninjured, though the pilot had to shut down his number one engine due to fire/overheat indications.

It appears, from this partial report, that Axlund was never located. One suspects wreckage from the aircraft was picked up, since the exact measurements of the lost vertical stabilizer appears to be known.

The track on the map that came with this partial report shows that the intercepts were conducted from the North Western tip of Washington down to about even with the Kalaloch area, where the collision occurred. The left and right elevons appear to have drifted quite a ways, having been located somewhere in the vicinity of Grays Harbor. The hand drawn map appears to have been copied several times and is of poor condition.

As ever, there seems to be very little information here. I know there is more out there. I would like to search newspapers from the era and area to see what they say, but my time and money are always in demand elsewhere. If ANY of you reader have something to add, PLEASE feel free to do so! Do it in a comment or e-mail me. I will do my best to publish it if you request it!

There are a few questions that rise here: What caused Axlund to misjudge the distance between him and the B-57? His aircraft was armed with training missiles. The F-106 had no guns, so getting THAT close to another aircraft when not refueling or flying formation seems unwise at best. Did Axlund suffer oxygen deprivation? Why else would he have gotten that close and not avoided a collision? There are several cases that support the stability of the Six in un-piloted flight, which would seem to support his not being conscious just prior to the collision.

You can see a picture and history of #59-0142 here.

Sources:

Accident report, electronic document, for #59-142.

B-57 Canberra In Action, Squadron Signal Publications. by Jim Mesko.

Pasco F-106 #57-2489 *update #2*

Contiuning with the F-106 theme, I have here one that went down much closer to my home than the others. Still, as with the other F-106 reports, it leaves much to be desired. This report has only 2 pages plus a map and a photo.

On Tuesday, March 19, 1963, (at about 1712Z or zulu, which would be 9:12am local, because PST is Zulu -8) an F-106 on a local training mission came down about 5 miles south of Pasco, Washington. Its pilot had reported control problems.

Earlier that morning, Captain William F. Tesmer and Lieutenant Donld L. Hatcher briefed for a local training mission. Expected takeoff time was 1615Z, however, their flight was scrambled early at 1557Z(7:57am local). Tesmer's callsign for the mission was AH06 and Hatcher's was AH05. At this time, AH06 reported "dolly in valid." This phrase is not familiar, so could be reference to some ground control point with that call sign, or perhaps he was reporting that his automated guidance/data link was faulty. The latter seems to be supported, though: Three voice intercepts were completed against SAC target Y209 (Again, probably a B-52 from a local base). The results were three "MA's" (Mission Accomplished?) for three attempts. AH05 then completed two data link passes. The first pairing for AH06 was at 1612Z and the last was at 1647Z. The last intercept was completed about 200NM southwest of Geiger Field.

At this time AH05 had 4800 pounds of fuel and AH06 had 6400. AH05 had gone supersonic, which acounted for the difference. Both were returning to base (RTB) at Geiger. AH06 was 12 miles in trail of AH05 at 40,000 feet. AH06 called tallyho on AH05 (meaning he had picked him up visually) and said he would make a pass on AH05 on the way back to Geiger. At 1657Z AH06 transmitted MAYDAY at GEORFF position DRQA5049. (I would sure love to know how this navigation system works)

AH05 stated that, to his knowledge, AH06's intercepts had been completely normal until his breakaway maneuver had begun. AH06 overtook AH06 on the starboard side "began a medium back turn to the left, passing directly overhead." Ah06 transmitted that his "flight controls are frozen" and requested that AH05 follow him. At this time AH05 estimated AH06's mach to be 1.3 or 1.4. AH06 suggested that his "vari-ramps have possibly not returned to their normal position" and "'there is no light on' (vari-ramp), indicating that he was at a supersonic speed sufficient to actuate the vari-ramps." (the vari-ramps would appear to be the F-106 version of a variable inlet. As airspeed increases, engineers have found that it is desirable to alter the flow of air into a jet engine to keep the incoming air subsonic, despite the speed of the aircraft. This is usually done by changing the inlet shape or placing baffles in the inlet. Different designers found different ways of doing the same thing, for example, on the SR-71, there was a movable cone that went forward or aft in front of the engine, according to the airspeed. for more information see this NASA site.)

AH05 observed AH06 perform two tight barrel rolls to the left and then stabilize into a shallow left turn. AH05 joined AH06 for the completion of a 360 degree turn. AH06 had descended from 40,000 feet to about 33,000 feet. At 29,000 feet AH05 lost visual contact with AH06 in the clouds. During the 360 degree turn, AH06 reported that "it fees as though it's stuck in flight mode; the trim button has no effect; I can only maintain 160-170 knots." After he entered the cloud deck, there is no more transcripts of the pilot's transmissions on this report, though, apparently, the "Tab U transcript" has more.

Captain Tesmer reported that he was ejecting at 1712Z. The crash occured sometime between 1712Z and 1719Z. Eye witnesses stated that the aircraft passed the east edge of Pasco on a SSE heading at about 1000 feet altitude. They observed the aircraft pull up as it approached rising terrain south of Kennewick, Washington. As it pulled up, an object, probably the canopy, came off the aircraft. "A few seconds later they observed a bright flash, smoke, dust, and heard a loud muffled explosion."

The accident was fatal for Captain Tesmer, though there are no details explaining how. It does not say where the body/ejection seat was found, nor does it offer any other details tht would flesh out this story.

The map appears to show the impact somewhere near Jump Off Joe, a peak of 2200 feet. Not too far from the Nine Canyon Wind Project. The photo shows the crash to be on plowed land. It seems unlikely, however, that there would be any remnants after 45 years of tillings.

The flight path shows the two aircraft came from the west over the Horse Heaen Hills, about half way between the Yakima Valley and the Columbia River. Tesmer is shown as descending to 28,000 feet above Badger, Washington. A few miles later, almost over the impact area, contact was lost with him at 16,000 feet. From here it seems he made a wide descending turn to the left to end up where he did. It would seem to me that Captain Tesmer could have jumped out earlier, but he chose to ride his mount and keep it under control as best he could. Was this to find a spot to land this high speed aircraft with a high landing speed(unlikely)? Or was this to make sure his aircraft did not come down on a populated area? It seems doubtful we will ever know for sure.

Additionally, it is interesting that F-106 #57-2489 is shown in at least one source as going down some 30 miles further to the south near Hermiston, Oregon instead of its official USAF position on the same date.

*UPDATES* (Many thanks to Gene Gould for his time in the local library) Here is some added information.
1. The crater left by the aircraft was about 20X30 feet and 6 feet deep.
2. The pilot, Tesmer, was a graduate of Ohio University.
3. He served 3 1/2 years in Japan before transfer to Geiger.
4. He was survived by his wife and two children(ages 1 and 4). His parents, too lost a son, they lived in Shaker Heights, Ohio.
5. Tesmer, according to the paper, did NOT eject. While the report did not say that he did, it did not say he did NOT eject. The popping of the canopy seemed to indicate he had, though, and given early F-106 dificulties with the ejection seat, I had wrongly assumed it was to be blamed.
6. The paper confirmed the assumption that Tesmer had likely stayed with the aircraft to avoid populated areas.

*UPDATE # 2*
After some emails and a little patience, a fuller story has come to be revealed. these are the additional details:

1. The aircraft appeared to strike the ground nearly vertically.
2. Despite the fact that the canopy was found about 2 1/2 miles NNW of the crash site, the pilot's "body had remained with the aircraft upon impact." The report blamed a malfunction of the seat as most likely. The F-106 had ejection seat difficulties early on.
3. Preliminary results indicated the there had been a loss of control or near loss of control.
4. The aircraft struck at a high speed or a high thrust, given the depth of the hole.
5. The remains of the aircraft were sifted through a screen and layed out in a hangar at Spokane Airport. the report basically suggests that all remnants were removed.
6. The report further suggests that maintenance forms and records were not kept.
7. The committee suggested that a steering/control problem had occured.

While this does not say much more than the library article and the original accident report, it does add a little to what we know. Hopefully this is the last update necessary, however, if you have any personal relation to the airplane, please leave a comment or drop me an email.

F-106 Troubles 1, #57-2484

I recently obtained a few F-106 accident reports from the early 1960s. These F-106s were assigned to the Spokane International Airport.

During the Cold War, and today, really, fighter squadrons were and are stationed around the United States with the intention that they would be able to intercept incoming bombers or other threats. The F-106s (retired in 1988) were assigned to the ADC, or Air Defense Command. The reports are not complete, in that little mention is made of blame or final solution. With that in mind, I am offering my best interpretations. If someone out there finds my suppositions to be false or you have a better description, by all means please e-mail me and I will make necessary corrections. Here is the first report.

On the morning of September 14, 1961, First Lieutenant Russell C. Wood briefed for a routine target mission. This would likely have been an intercept of a B-52 training in the area. Given the location of SAC bases, the B-52 could have been from Larson AFB, Fairchild AFB, or any number of other bases in the Northwest (Idaho, Montanna...etc.). It could have also been an intercept of an EB-57 , which was used to test the Air Defenses of the Continental US, though, I believe that to be unlikely. From what I understand the EB-57s were used for training and checking the radar systems and operators, not necessarily the ADC fighters.

Airman second class Kenneth D. Hintz accompanied Wood on his walk around of F-106A #57-2484. There were no discrepancies and Hintz secured the access panels while Wood strapped in. One combustion start was attempted with no success, but a pneumatic start worked at 0915. The MA-1 power system timed in and they made various checks, then Wood taxied to the ramp. He was airborne a 0926, 6 minutes after the proposed time. Estimated fuel onboard was 8900 pounds.

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Wood made a left turn out of traffic and began his climb on a heading of 326. The proposed flight plan was "Geiger direct 52 degrees N. 122 degrees W. (William's Lake B.C.) direct Larson TACAN, direct Spokane VORTAC." That looks like a trip to the North East to British Columbia, a turn to the South West back to Larson, then a turn to the East to end up back at Spokane. The F-106 on the same flight profile and plan 1/2 hour behind heard his check-ins via radio, but no ground stations did.

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It was not until he was over the Larson TACAN at 1038 at FL480 (48,000 feet) that Spokan Center heard from him. He then contacted Spokane Approach Control and was positively identified on radar (No difficult feat considering there probably were not many other aircraft at FL480) and "he was cleared to the 35 mile fix of the Spokane VORTAC, report inbound." (VORTAC stands for: VHF Omnidirectional Range/Tactical Aircraft Control)

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He reported over the fix at FL200. He was instructed to report once he passed FL70. At 24 miles he was advised of traffic, a DC-6, at 14 miles West of VORTAC. At 15 miles he was dvised to begin his landing cockpit check. He reported when he passed through 7000 feet, and requested a "surveillance approach to runway 03." He was told to level off at 4000 feet and he acknowledged. Again he was advised of traffic, and told to "prepare to start his descent in 4 miles."

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He then told RAPCON (Radar Approach Control) that he would have to break off this approach, but they did not respond. He continued his pproach, then was told to start his descent. Twelve seconds later he was told to maintain 4000 feet and turn right to 150 because of traffic. He reported steady on 150, and then was told to turn to 205 and maintain 4000. 30 seconds later the tower observd him continue turning past 205. They asked if he was continuing this appoach on his own, to which he replied, "Negative, I would like a surveillance approach to runway 03." They told him to stop his turn and then proceeded to give him a "no-gyro" approach. At 5 miles he was told to begin his descet. Radar contact was lost at three miles, which was normal considering ground clutter.

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The aircraft crashed 2.4 miles from the runway on a heading of 063 degrees true. The smoke was observed from Spokane Tower at 1102. Wood ejected, but unsuccessfully from an altitude of 200-500 feet above the ground.

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The report ends with the summation that there was no indication of emergency from Wood. It does not state what caused the crash. It does not go into anything else. Simply the flight description. This, in the my world of aircraft accident reports, is annoying, since others generally have a page where a determination of cause is surmised if it isn't known.

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As an unqualified observer from almost 50 years on, I offer my supposition that it may have been possible for his J-75 to flame out. I don't know what would have caused a flame-out, though. Perhaps he retarded the fuel flow for a moment or there was a stuck valve. Did he suffer a bird strike? Until the rest of the report is released or someone comes forward with a better idea, that is what we are left with.

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The picture of the crash site and this ground track are all that is included with this report. On the map you can make out the B-52 and KC-135 shapes to the left where Fairchild is, and the F-106 and civil aircraft shapes at Spokane International.

Note: On 30 August 1956 the Air Coordinating Committee approved a common military-civil short-range air navigation system called VORTAC, which combined TACAN with the Civil Aeronautic Authority's very high frequency omnirange direction finder. see link at left.

Note: TACAN stands for Tactical Air Navigation. see wikipedia link at left.