The Tale of P-38 #44-23914

A fellow wreck chasing enthusiast and I visited the site of #44-23914 just over a year ago.  I was amazed at how  much, and yet, how little, remained.  The forces that are at play in an aircraft crash are phenomenal!  The majority of the pieces we saw bespoke a horrible and violent end.  There were pieces of aluminum that had been fold like an accordion.  Others were simply misshapen to the extent that their original form was unrecognizable.

My friend, Mr. Gould, obtained the accident report for #44-23914 and furnished me with a copy.  I now present the small amount of information contained therein along with some other components that will fill out the story.  Unfortunately, the report leaves more questions than it answers.

The day was September 30, 1944.  A few days earlier and about 20 miles to the south, the super-secret Uranium pile of the B-Reactor, part of the Manhattan Project, had gone critical for the first time.  Further away, men of the US and its allies in Europe had just taken part in in the ill-fated Operation Market Garden and were withdrawing to lick their wounds.  The situation in the Pacific was looking up, soon our forces would be gathering for another invasion, this time on the Philippine Islands.  The small town of Othello a few miles away was quiet, except for the freight trains bearing war materials every now and then. The wind was moving at a leisurely 9 miles per hour.  There were a few clouds above the valley floor.  The farm land did not show the scars of war, yet.  That would change this afternoon.

There were several Army Air Fields near by.  Moses Lake Army Air Field was the closest.  The fighters from that base would be training throughout the day over the farmland of Eastern Washington.  The fast Lockheed fighter was the one that was seen most.  It could be seen in flights of four, most days.  The pilots would be going through the various training missions.  From navigation, to bombing, to dogfights and low level flight.

The P-38 Lightning was recognizable because of its unique shape.  Instead of the normal cross shape of most aircraft, the P-38 looked a lot like two T's written close together and attached at the bottom.  It had two engines and was a great fighter as long as the pilot did not mistreat it.  A training film of the era cautioned against inverted flight for any length of time, as the oil pressure would drop dramatically and ruin the bearings in the engines.  It also stated that if you needed to recover the aircraft in a downward maneuver, you needed to have at least 10,000 feet altitude.

On this particular day, at 12:55PM, yet another flight of P-38s had left Moses Lake Army Air Field.  These four proceeded to a local gunnery range for a sighter burst and then climbed to 12,000ft. for a syllabus of "supervised acrobatics" and individual combat. (the number three man, 2nd Lt. James B. Keller, and number four man,2nd Lt. John W, Eveland, both stated that they were actually at 7000-8000, this difference in stated altitudes is interesting.  The leader, 1st Lt. Charles N. Fagan, stated that the cloud bases were at 7000-8000 feet and the cloud tops at 11,000.  Could this be a mix up?)

The leader strung his formation out in "String Formation." and began to "rat race" around the cloud tops.  This would appear to be simply a game of follow the leader.  At one point, about 1:30PM, according to all flight members, the formation passed into the top of a cloud or through a wisp cloud (again, they differ).  The flight members all stated that they were only in the cloud for one to two seconds at most.  They did not even switch to instruments.  When they entered the cloud, the number two man was there where he belonged.  When they came out he was gone.

The number two man was Flying Officer Gene L. Dyer, apparently of Australia.  He was flying P-38L #44-23914.  There were no problems listed concerning the aircraft, save for the left oil shutter which was left in automatic.  Dyer simply disappeared from the flight.  A BT-13 pilot, 2nd Lt. Morris D. English, flying in the general area witnessed a P-38 in a spin at about 1:20PM, it came out of the bottom of a cloud at about 6500 feet and at about 5000 momentarily recovered in a nose down position.  The BT-13 pilot did not see more because a cloud obscured his vision.

When he was noted as missing, his flight made radio calls to him and to Moses Lake tower.  They flew around looking for the crash site.  Then they headed back to the field to see what the tower knew.  Lt. Fagan took another plane out and searched for Dyer.  He located the wreck and guided the crash truck and ambulance to the site.

The majority of the aircraft was recovered.  What remains today are just small pieces.  Some of the cylinder housings from the engines, various hydraulic fittings and hoses, and even the side of a Browning Mk. 2 .50 caliber machine gun.  There is just a crater or impact scar that marks the place where Gene L. Dyer died.  There is no other marker.

What happened?  Is it possible for things to go so completely wrong in 1-2 seconds that you cannot even call for help in your plummet to the ground?  Given the characteristics of the P-38, and the eye-witness report from the BT-13 pilot, it seems that Dyer somehow got himself into a spin and may have been recovering.  The ground level at the crash site is about 1000 feet above sea level.  If the flight was at 12,000 feet, it seems completely possible that Dyer had plenty of room to recover.  However, if the two other members of the flight were indeed correct when they stated that the flight was at 7000 to 8000 feet, it seems Dyer was just too low to recover completely from the spin.

Is it possible that the three members of his flight were covering for each other when perhaps they had been doing maneuvers that were not permitted?  I do not know.  I only bring it up because of the amazingly short amount of time that he was out of sight and the conflicting reports, which do not seem to have been questioned by anyone.  Even though I am aware that accidents can happen very fast, the report just seems to be missing something.  I suppose we will never know for sure.


Sources:

USAF accident report for #44-23914

Personal observations of wreck site, March 14, 2009.

http://www.othellowashington.us/

YouTube, WWII era training film.
  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDmIB7u18_0

C-141A 65-281 Burns on Ramp At McChord AFB.

This is 67-0013, she resides at Pima Air and Space Museum.  She retired with 38,225 flight hours.  Photo taken Spring of 2008.

During my childhood, in the 1980s, to see a Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, all you had to do was wait until about 5:15PM, then look up.  Our house was directly under their training path.  A-6 Intruders also used the same path at times, too.  The C-141s originated from McChord AFB, near Tacoma, Washington.  McChord remains a transport hub for the Air Force to this day.  Today, however, they fly the C-17 Globemaster III.  The C-17 is comparatively new, though.  The Starlifter flew from the mid-1960s until May of 2006.

In the early days of any aircraft’s service, accidents happen more often than in its later life.  For example, the F-106 served from the late 1950s to 1988.  The majority of accidents both flight and otherwise, happened in the early 1960s.  The same was not true for the C-141.  The accidents for the C-141 continued throughout its lifetime.  A cursory exam of the losses indicates no particular time where there were more.  In fact, 281 was the first C-141 lost to any cause, an entire year after Dover AFB received their first C-141. 

I usually write up accidents that happened in flight, usually because one has at least a small chance of locating it and seeing it.  This accident, however, was an accident that happened while it was parked on the ramp.  The entire aircraft was destroyed.  Why write on this?  The C-141 had a VERY long history in Washington State.  It holds a special place in my heart because of my childhood memories.  And there are only two accidents that destroyed a C-141 in Washington State of which I am aware.  It was the first C-141 lost.  And three men, Michael Solomon, Ralph Gentry, Jr., and James Norman, lost their lives because of it.

On August 29, 1966, C-141A #65-281 was delivered to the USAF.  It had about 12 flying hours on it when it was delivered, and only about 53 flying hours at the time of the accident (for transports, that is an amazingly low number).     By the end of their careers, the average flight time for retired C-141s was 37,000 flight hours.  C-141 # 65-0251 had an amazing 46,732! The ship listed with the least number of hours, by the way, is the subject of today’s article.   

On September 7, 1966, in the early morning hours, C-141 #65-281 was consumed by fire while parked on ramp spot J-11.  Three men died. 

On the evening of September 6^th, 281 was being readied for a scheduled mission.  These preparations continued through the night.   She had been plagued with fuel system and fuel quantity indication system problems since before delivery.  In fact, there had been twenty-three write-ups even before delivery!   Since delivery, little over a week previous, pilots had made eleven write-ups concerning the fuel system.  The eleventh one was one of the subjects of this nights labors. 

Problems with the system had been occurring all night.  Removal, cleaning and reinstallation of the fuel quantity probes had not fixed the problem.  Even substitution of probes from another aircraft failed to fix the problem.  Due to these problems the mission was changed and crews began defueling 281 from 135,000 pounds of fuel to 80,000 pounds.  Both the extended range tanks were emptied, which was completed at about 0545. 

 A fuel capacitance check was to be made on the right side extended range tank.  This tank needed to be completely emptied and required draining it from the bottom of the wing.   This was done by sticking a “condensate drain tube” into the fuel tank condensate drain valve.  The fuel emptied through the tube into a bucket, which was then emptied into a fuel bowser(another term for mobile fuel tank). 

During this time additional discrepancies were discovered.  The aircraft power “ON” light was inoperative in the test position, and the rotation beacon was not operating properly.   The team chief and three apprentices went to the aircraft cockpit to initiate a partial power on maintenance preflight, while the electricians began working on the AC power “ON” discrepancy.  The electricians began by removing an electrical panel, but found the socket had power, so they sat on a lower bunk to study the electrical diagram.

Meanwhile two instrument specialists were working to diagnose the fuel quantity system under the right wing.  They attached the C-141 adapter cables to the tank receptacle on the aft wing spar in the area of the flap well.  These attached to a fuel test adapter and a test unit.  These units were on a maintenance stand, and needed to be plugged into a power unit.  A third instrument man proceeded to lay out a cord to the mobile power unit, which was fifty to 100 feet away, just around the nose of the aircraft. 

At about 0629 power was interrupted, momentarily turning the lights out.  The team chief looked out the window and saw a man at the mobile power unit instrument panel.   He immediately switched the external power select switch to “off” and departed the aircraft to investigate the power problems.  The electricians continued to examine the diagrams by flashlight.  The chief was having words with the man at the mobile power unit when the instrument man plugged the power cord into the power unit.  The chief turned and began to walk to the adjacent aircraft, which was also his responsibility. 

It was at this moment, some 10 to 15 seconds after the cord was plugged into the power unit, that an explosion came out from under the right wing of 281.  The explosion sparked a fire and men began to evacuate the aircraft. 

All of the men made it out of the aircraft, departing by varied exits.  One of the electricians, James Norman, however, chose to exit via the right rear troop door and suffered severe burns.  He died nine days later.  The two men under the right wing, Michael Solomon and Ralph Gentry, both received fatal injuries and burns.  The entire aircraft was destroyed by the explosion and fire. 

This is a photo of what remained of #65-281.Copyright: USAF Photo Via C-141 Heaven.

Though the report does not give a cause, the real story is obvious.  Fuel had been drained in the vicinity of the electrical equipment being used to determine the cause of the fuel system problems, it seems more than likely that a spark from the equipment as it was warming up ignited fuel fumes in the area.  Fire is always bad for an aircraft.  

The C-141A was about 145 feet in length with a wingspan of 160 feet.  Its wings were mounted high on the fuselage allowing the engines to hang from them, giving maintenance personnel better access than previous aircraft with reciprocating engines allowed.  In the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, the entire fleet was modified to C-141Bs by adding a mid-air refueling capability and 23 feet to the fuselage, allowing more volume to be transported.  It served for over forty years.  They began service in 1965, and the last one was retired in 2006.  If you would like to learn more about the men who flew and maintained the C-141 and the Aircraft itself, try going here.


Sources:


Accident report for #65-281, USAF.


C-141 Heaven,  http://www.c141heaven.com/

Wikipedia.

F-106 #59-022, Raymond, Washington, October 3, 1967

(Photo of #59-022, from Marty Isham Collection via http://www.f-106deltadart.com [I shamelessly heisted it, but you should definitely stop by this site, since they are the penultimate experts on all things F-106!])

The F-106 was a wonderful craft. It could dog-fight. It could go supersonic and reach incredible altitudes. It was equipped with the amazing MA-1 fire control system, which, hooked into the SAGE network could guide it to a target and fire its weapons almost completely automatically. In its almost 40 years, it had the best safety record of all Air Force single engine aircraft, still, of the 340 aircraft built, 112 were lost in operational accidents, either on the ground or in the air.

In the late 1960s, the F-106 fleet had been selected to be modified with Supersonic external fuel tanks and in-flight refueling equipment. This was begun in 1967. The first of the sixes to obtain these modifications were Washington State based sixes. On October 3, 1967, F-106A, #59-022 was scheduled for a functional test flight after having these modifications.

Major Richard S. Petersen was assigned. He filed a DD form 175 (IFR flight plan, or Instrument Flight Rules[indicates he would be using instruments and electronic means to fly the aircraft, usually used in poor weather, rather than visual flight rules used in clear air]) at the Base Operations as LK 19 (Lima Kilo 19). The estimated departure time was 1700Z, or 1000 local, for an hour and 15 minute test hop. He began his weather briefing at about a quarter to 0845 (1545z). The weather at McChord was 1000 feet scattered, 4500 scattered, and 7000 broken, with 15 miles visibility. Forecast was 800 broken, 4000 broken, and 7000 overcast with visibilty at 7 miles with light rain. He got a weather waiver from the deputy commander for flight operations (This indicates that it probably wasn't a big deal to fly in weather, since the waiver was given). Clearance was filed at 1556Z (0856 PST), a little over an hour ahead of scheduled departure.

Petersen went to the Fighter Squadron, donned his flight gear and proceeded to the flight line. He did his walk around and began his preflight. After engine start, though, he told the crew chief that the attitude director indicator (ADI) would not erect properly. An instrument technician was sent to the aircraft. He replaced the ADI power supply. Satisfied with the aircraft, the pilot taxied out and began his check lists, now 46 minutes behind schedule (1046).

Lima Kilo 19 was cleared to flight level 360, or 36,000 feet. departure instructions were to turn right to a heading of 288 and maintain 4000 feet until he was 7 miles west. When he reached this point he was cleared by RAPCON to climb to his assigned altitude. He was handed of to Seattle Center and then to ADC Control (landferry) when he was appoximatel;y 20 nautical miles south of Neah Bay for flight monitoring. Landferry cleared LK 19 for his supersonic run on a heading of 150, parallel to the shore, but at 20 miles out.

Lima Kilo 19 requested a 75 mile extension to his supersonic leg. When asked, he reported that his speed was mach 1.3 at 40,000 feet. At 1116 local, Lima Kilo 19 reported that he could not obtain mach and requested a recovery vector. The vector given was 040. He was cleared to descend to FL310 when he requested it. Seattle Center assumed control at 1122 and cleared LK19 to descend to 5000 feet.

At 1122:11 Petersen acknowledged the descent and reported out of 31000. Seven seconds later he told Seattle Center that he, "Would like a minimum of turns on the letdown 'til I can go VFR. I've lost my flight instruments, ..uh..attitude indicator tape." (most F-106s were equipped with vertical tape instruments that were supposed to be easier to read than traditional circular types. Supposed;y they could give more information faster than the traditional type) Two minutes later Petersen advised Seattle Center that he had, "lost all flight instruments of...sh...in a descent at this time--and I'd sorta like to bail out of this thing." The time was 1124:55. This was the last transmission that Lima Kilo 19 made.

Radar plots indicated that he was making a right turn from an Easterly heading to a Westerly heading. The aircraft crashed in an open field in a very steep attitude, the accident report estimated it at 60 degrees nose down. The final heading, on impact was turning right at 061 degrees, putting it on a South West track at that time. Major Petersen did eject, but unsuccessfully. The Canopy, the seat, and his body was discovered about 1/3 of a mile to the Southwest on a hill about 300 feet about the aircraft. The aircraft hit near Raymond Washington.

The weather was mostly cloudy if one reads the forecast correctly. Given the fact that he was cleared for Instrument Flight Rules, and his wish to obtain Visual Flight Rules conditions, it seems likely that his instruments were either giving him faulty or no reading at all. In that sort of environment, there is no horizon to gage attitude by. The motion of the aircraft is enough to over-ride the human cochlea and it is easy to think you are going in the right direction when you are not. Major Petersen seemed completely aware of this and was quite ready to depart the aircraft when his instruments began to go south.

Early F-106 ejection seats were notorious for poor performance. The early seats had been replaced by the "B" seat and finally by the "Zero-Zero" seat. This meant that it could safely take its occupant away from the airframe at Zero Altitude and Zero Speed. By 1967 most of the kinks had been worked out and the "Zero-Zero" seat had been fitted to the entire fleet.

It would appear that bad luck had been a large factor in Major Petersen's demise. First, bad luck that his instruments failed TWICE. Then that he was unable to complete his entire mach run. And, when his instruments failed a second time, his aircraft was in "the soup" (or bad weather) and he could not visually determine the attitude of his aircraft to bring it in safely. Finally, when he DID eject, something (and this accident report fails to identify what) caused him to sustain injuries that killed him.

The Convair F-106 Delta Dart was the interceptor that kept American skies clear of Communist aggressors for almost 40 years. It served with distinction, but never fired a shot in anger. After it was retired the majority of the survivors suffered the semi-inglorious fate of being used as targets. Some defend this as the most noble end for a FIGHTER, they consider it a better fate than sitting on a pole. Others may be saddened that a jet that kept America safe for so long suffered such an indignity. Either way, the SIX was a fighter no matter which side you land on. There are enough that remain today on display that most people will be able to see one in person if they don't mind a short drive.

Sources:

Accident report for #59-022 obtained from USAF.

F-106 Delta Dart.com http://www.f-106deltadart.com/history.htm

P-38H #42-66767, Ellensburg AAF AND Paine AAF. December 1943

Some people have bad luck; we called them unlucky. Some vehicles have bad luck; we call them lemons, especially when dealing with cars. What do you call an aircraft with bad luck, though? P-38H #42-66767 might fall into the category of an unlucky airplane. What about a group of machines built at about the same time? #42-66767’s siblings might also fall into this category, but more on them later. Aircraft #42-66767 was a P-38H-5 LO.

First, a little information about military aircraft designations. When a company gets approved to produce a new aircraft, that company produces a first example. In some cases, two or three. These are usually given designations beginning with X, basically indicating the aircraft was experimental. So the first P-38 would have been the XP-38. During that era, the first few production/service examples were given a designation beginning with Y, meaning these were prototypes. So the first few P-38s were YP-38s. The first model of an aircraft to see service, that is full service, is usually followed by A, so there was a P-38A. When the designers make improvements that are major, the aircraft undergoes a model change. The P-38H was a result of many improvements on the original P-38A. Sometimes, during a production run, minor changes or improvements are implemented. If they do not entail a model change, these improvements are marked by block numbers. Block numbers are a way to keep track of minor improvements since the first new model. Usually they jump by five, so the second block would be -5, then -10, then -15, however, that was not always the case. Sometimes these block numbers were followed by letters designating the factory at which the aircraft was constructed. A B-29A -10 BW would have been the third block built at the Boeing Witchita plant. So, P-38H-5 LO #42-66767 had minor differences from the earlier P-38H blocks. LO stood for the Lockheed plant.

P-38H-5 LO #42-66767 was assigned to Ellensburg Army Air Field. At the time, the field was used for training. On the first day of December, 1943, 66767 had already been up twice with two different pilots when Flight Officer Russell W. Senger got into her for a local gunnery mission at a little after 4pm local time. He went through his check lists and then taxied out to the active runway and took off as part of a four ship flight. The aircraft had been checked out and was considered airworthy, which she was. At about 5:30, Senger landed safely on Runway 29. His flight was cleared to taxi. It was 1734 hours, or 5:34pm. At that time of year in Central Washington it begins to get dark at about 4:30pm (in fact as this is being written, November 29, 2009, it is now 5:22pm and I consider it to be completely dark outside). It was well into dusk then, when Senger began taxiing back to the parking area. He had only go about 600 feet when the right main gear left the taxiway and entered a drainage ditch, which was about 4 ½ feet deep. The pilot could not right the situation once it had happened, and momentum carried it another 100 feet where it stopped at a right angle to the taxiway. A P-38 pilot taxiing behind him notified the tower of the accident. The accident board attributed it as 75% pilot error (carelessness) and 25% taxiway construction. They recommended painting marker lines on the taxiway.

Normally, that would be the end of an article like this. The aircraft would have been repaired and sent back to service. However, 66767 was an unfortunate aircraft. 66767’s nosewheel had been damaged in the December 1^st accident. A group of workmen from the 32^nd sub-depot at Paine Field replaced the entire assembly. However, they were unable to repair the nosewheel door because there was no sheet metal shop facilities at Ellensburg AAF. The Engineering officer decided to have her flown the short distance to the 32^nd sub-depot at Paine Field with her wheels locked down.

The gear handle was placed in down and safetied (Captain Laven’s account says it was safetied with wire). The main landing gear shut-off valve was closed to prevent an inadvertant gear-raising. Captain George Laven, Jr. was chosen to fly the aircraft to Paine Field on December 29, 1943. He took off at 3:48pm and encountered no trouble during the flight, except that the propeller on the left engine went out and he had to set to the manual position (What he meant by that was probably the variable pitch propeller was not operating automatically, so he had to operate it manually). He entered the landing pattern at Paine Field at about 4:30pm. Everything was normal until about 200 yards into the landing roll when he felt the ship turning right. He applied left brake, but the ship continued to pull right. He looked over and noticed that the right wing was lowering and felt the ship settle in that direction. He knew then that the right gear was collapsing and so as much left brake as he could to ease the turn. As soon as it left the runway he shut off the booster pumps, batteries, and mixture controls. When the ship stopped he exited the aircraft, no doubt, with alacrity.

First Lieutenant Robert W. Campbell, assistant operations officer at Paine Field, witnessed Laven enter the pattern and land. He watched as the right gear began to collapse and the plane veared off the runway. He jumped in a vehicle and headed for the scene of the accident. When he arrived the pilot was out of the aircraft.

The accident board discovered that the “right landing gear locking pin had been screwed down too far.” This prevented the gear from completely locking. The shut-off valve had also been shut in cold weather on the eastern side of the state while cold oil was still in the line bewteen the main gear and the actuating cylinder. The oil became heated due to engine temperatures and the warmer external air temperatures of the coastal climate over Everett, Washington. The heat expanded the oil sufficiently to partially move the actuating cylinder enough to dislodge the locking pin. The shock of landing and Laven’s application of brakes put enough force on the gear to retract.

As a result of this accident both engines were damaged by sudden stoppage. Three propeller blades were bent. The lower stabilizer and rudder were bent and crushed. Relatively minor dame considering.

I do not have information concerning what happened to 66767 after this. Given the amount of damage described in the report, it seems she was probably repaired and went on to lead a productive life, perhaps eventually becoming a part of the soda can we drink from, or perhaps she eventually made her way overseas and saw a different end. We may never know.

That 66767 was unlucky, may remain to be seen, since the damage she sustained was minimal and she could be returned to flying status. That her sisters were unlucky is no joke. #42-66775, #42-66768, and #42-66778 all met similar fates. I will write of them at a later date, though.

Sources:

Accident reports for #42-66767, dates: 12-1-1943 and 12-28-1943.

Fighter Planes, http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/p38_lightning.htm

P-38L #44-24350

On September 14, 1944, 2nd Lt. Glenn Ingersoll took off from Moses Lake Army Air Field as the number three ship in a four ship Oxygen Training mission above 20,000 feet. A short time later, his body was resting with the smoldering pieces of the P-38 he rode to his death about five miles West of Warden, Washington.

That morning, P-38L #44-24350 would have been fueled and readied for its coming flight. The two Allison V-1710s would have been readied for their flight to 25,000 feet. The fluids topped off and everything fixed as well as possible. Start up would have been followed by a taxi out to the active runway. All four ships would have checked their brakes and their engines would have been run up. Then, with a signal from the lead pilot, all four would have rushed down the runway. Or, if they were taking off one-by-one, the lead would have taken off and started on a slight turn, the next a slightly sharper turn, and the third a sharper turn than that, and so on. All would have joined up eventully and made the long climb to 20,000 feet.

The point of this exercise would have been to familiarize the new pilots with operating at altitude with oxygen masks and all the attendant difficulties associated with completing a mission profile. Eventually they would likely have been tasked with long range navigation and other onerous tasks while wearing oxygen masks. On this mission, though, the lead pilot, 1st Lt. Clarence Seltz, had instructed the flight to spread out and feel the plane out at 25,000 feet. The air is thinner there and the plane would have acted slightly differently than it would have at 5,000 feet.

Ingersoll's aircraft broke from the formation in a normal way, according to the number four pilot, 2nd Lt. Edward Meeker. Meeker continued to fly wing on Ingersoll until they had lost about 3,000 feet, at which time Ingersoll's aircraft had become difficult to fly formation on. Meeker broke off. When he broke off from Ingersoll, Meeker said that Ingersoll was very erratic and turning very fast, so that Meeker could not make out which way he was going. He rejoined with the leader at 25,000 feet expecting Ingersoll to rejoin also. This happened about 0930. The flight landed at 1000. Ingersoll never did joined up.

The Accident Board determined that the crash was caused by the pilot experiencing compressibility. A phenomenon encountered when the P-38 (and other aircraft of the era) reached too high of a speed and the air around it interacted with the aircraft controls in ways that made controlled flight difficult to impossible. Usually the latter. Compressibility created a nose down condition in the P-38, which continued to induce compressibility. Few control inputs could help the problem once it was encountered in full force. Ingersoll's aircraft began to break apart in flight at about 4,000 feet.

Ed Knecht "observed" the accident from a distance. He said he saw pieces come from the aircraft, but could not identify what those pieces were.

The board decided Ingersoll had encountered compressibility and used elevator trim with no success, then he used the dive flaps, at which time the aircraft responded, but, at the speeds and forces in question, the aircraft disintegrated, and the "G" forces encountered killed the pilot. The second theory was that the pilot experienced hypoxia.

The accident board suggested that it was pilot error, because no malfunction with the aircraft could be found. It was not an old aircraft; it had less than 53 hours on it. Still, he should have been familiar with compressibility. The other possibility was "Oxygen Starvation" or Hypoxia. Two days prior to the accident, Ingersoll had crash landed another P-38. His personal oxygen mask was found in the first crashed P-38 after this crash. It was supposed that he had borrowed a different oxygen mask, which may not have been fitted in the correct fashion, thus causing hypoxia. If his oxygen mask had not fit perfectly, it seems possible that he may have experienced oxygen starvation. He had been through 9 hours of high altitude formation flying. He had been through the oxygen chamber. He knew what could happen. He may not have recognized the signs, however. Having lost consciousness it is not a great leap to assume he lost control, too. The P-38 dove, gaining speed until it encountered compressibility which induced even more nose down attitude, which increased speed. When he was finally low enough to recover from his daze, he may have tried to lower the dive brakes, but it was too late.

The committee recommended that flight leads make sure that their charges were fitted with the correct oxygen masks, since they were in a position to make sure of such things.

So, what killed Glenn Ingersoll? Hypoxia or compressibility? Both? It is likely that we will never know. The fact that Ingersoll's mask was found in the first P-38 would seem to indicate that he may have perished because of a mis-fitting oxygen mask. It is a sad truth that many of the deaths experienced state-side were training related, but they did not die in vane, these deaths served to educate and better arm the men who survived so they might better survive a tour overseas.

Thank You, 2nd Lieutenant Ingersoll for your sacrifice.

Wilbur B-29 #44-69989

In the aftermath of WWII, Americans wanted their troops home. NOW. Once hot to fight and win a war on two fronts, public fervor cooled significantly once the cries for peace arose in the West and the East. Gone was the cool, level-headed father-figure of Roosevelt, here was the country-bumpkin dropped-into-the-frying-pan Harry S. Truman.

He faced unheard of trials in the days after being sworn in. President Roosevelt had not seen fit to keep him up to speed on all things. He was notified within hours of Roosevelt's death, but after Stalin, of the existence of the atomic bomb (though not by the same people). He was not particularly deft at international diplomacy, so his debut at Potsdam was less than stellar. He did make a big decision, though: he decided to drop the bomb. He also presided over the peace that came. A series of labor strikes and economic upheaval followed the war, though, calling his leadership into question.

To fund new domestic spending requirements the military was demobilized in massive numbers as fast as possible. All branches were affected. The US Navy mothballed hundreds of ships in the three years after the war. All but a few battleships were resting pier side within a year of the end of the war. Tons of equipment was either sold to other countries or melted down. Sometimes it was taken straight from the factory to the scrap yard.

The Army Air Forces once boasted fleets of aircraft in the tens of thousands, and a fleet of over 2,800 B-29 bombers alone at war's end. By 1947, the newly created Air Force had fewer than 300 B-29s in active service (largely because of the small number of air crews to pilot them). Only a few of which, in the 509th bomb group, could deliver an atomic bomb.

It was in 1947, however, that things were changing yet again. The Soviet Union had been proving difficult to deal with. Stalin continued to retain his "Satellite" states despite United Nations and US demands for the satellite states to be made independent. Recent communist ventures included Greece and few others that raised US fears of expansion. It did not help that Stalin continued to preach his expansionist intentions.

Defense planners began to work on the best way to deal with the Soviet Union within months, if not weeks, of the end of the war. The US monopoly on Atomic Weapons made strategic aircraft an important factor in any such plan. As the Soviets continued to ignore deadlines for release of states, continued to talk about expansion, and continued to stall the re-unification of Germany, tensions in US defense circles continued to rise. Efforts were began to bolster the numbers of air crews that would be needed for the new jet bombers scheduled to come on line in the next few years.

There were nearly two thousand B-29s in storage. Bringing them out of storage, fixing them up and using them to train and hone new air crews was now an objective. Expanding the military was going to prevent the Soviet Union from making the move that was so feared.

The B-29 was a four-engined bomber developed by the Boeing Aircraft Company to carry heavy bomb loads long distances. It consisted of a very aerodynamic fuselage and narrow low drag wings. It had four large Wright R-3350 Duplex Cyclone engines sporting 18 cylinders each. These wonderful engines were the fruit of years of labor and design. The engines were miracles of engineering! They did not have to depend on a heavy liquid cooling system, all they needed was air. The only problem with B-29s was that, in the early years, their engines had a habit of overheating (for the real story on the R-3350 and the building of the Chrysler production line in Chicago, please see this site. It is well worth the time it takes to read.).

On November 4th, 1947, B-29 #44-69989 crash-landed in a wheat-stubble field just three miles South West of Wilbur, Washington. The course of events leading up to this, while perhaps not complicated, was definitely steeped in politics of the era.

The B-29 in question had originated from Warner Robins AFB. Warner Robins did not exist ten years previous. It did not begin life until 1941 when the ground was broken for a depot. It was not until January of 1942 that it was named Warner Robins. By 1947 it was being used to rehabilitate aircraft.

The ferry crew picked the aircraft up at Warner Robins AFB on November 3, 1947, and flew it to Forth Worth, Texas. From Fort Worth, they planned to fly the aircraft to Spokane Army Air Field. The flight went well, they flew at 20,000 feet and as expected discovered a frontal area that topped out at 15,000. As they were letting down into SPAAF in weather (read overcast). All of sudden, the number three propeller began to run away, or overspeed. Overspeed happens when the propeller wants to turn faster than the engine due to external pressures, like airflow, putting stresses on the engine that can damage it. left unchecked the massive propeller blades COULD fly off and damage the aircraft fatally. Usually the variable pitch propellers of the era would simply change their pitch to maintain the same engine RPM, however, 9989's number three propeller system was not working.

Major Douglas H. Kellar, of the 345th squadron, was the pilot. As he was beginning to bring 9989 in for the base leg at SPAAF, the engineer, Robert C. Marks, called out to watch number three engine. He had been in the middle of his check list. Everything was ready. The RPMs were set at 2200, gear and flaps were up, and the "putt putt," or auxiliary engine was on the line (it supplied auxiliary electricity at times like landings and take off because the main engines would be called on to make throttle changes and might not keep up the appropriate electrical load. The B-29 had numerous motors and servos that required electricity. When the B-29 was designed it was decided that electric motors would be less prone to battle damage than a hydraulic system.) Marks noticed that number 3 engine was up to 2250 RPM. He checked to make sure the pilots were not adjusting it, but it continued to climb.

The co-pilot, Major Edison F. Arnold, also of the 345th, noticed that the engine RPMs were about 2700 and climbing. He attempted to bring the RPMs down with the RPM toggle switch, but that did not work. Major Kellar retarded the throttle and Major Arnold pushed the feathering button. That only brought the RPM down about 300 hundred RPM, but it quickly began to rise again. They repeated the process after it was obvious there was no action the first time. This also did not work. Then Marks reported that number 3 engine was losing oil rapidly. It was coming from behind the propeller governors. The right scanner, William Schafer, also noticed the oil leak.

At this point Arnold declared an emergency, or in his words, he, "notified GCA that we were in trouble." He also notified them that they were heading West to find clear weather. GCA had him down as saying: "Having trouble with number 3 engine, turning westward." The ceiling at SPAAF was only about 400 feet above the ground. They had been through some heavy precipitation in the course of their let down and realized that it would be difficult to make the approach the first time. Kellar did not feel it safe to continue the GCA let down because if they should have to make a go around, the number three engine would not be available for use. They knew that the weather cleared to the west, so they decided to try to make it to Moses Lake or Ephrata. This would give them a chance to control their difficulties without sacrificing altitude in a GCA letdown. If they could not fix it, they would bail out. Kellar instructed the crew to prepare to abandon the airplane.

They slowed the aircraft to 180mph and that seemed to help hold the RPM down. The oil continued to leak out of number 3. Marks shut down number 3 by turning off the magnetos and fuel flow. The oil pressure in the nose of the engine was down to 10 pounds, but the pressure in the rear continued to hold until there remained only about 10 gallons of oil, then it began to oscillate. Marks reported, "We lost 55 gal[lon]s of oil in about 15 to 20 minutes." Major Kellar asked if there was a chance of fire, to which Marks replied, "With all that oil there was a very good possibility." Someone in the crew requested that they belly it in, but Kellar replied that the land below was too rough for that. The vibration from the surging engine and prop was considerable. Kellar feared the propeller might leave the nacelle and strike the cabin if the engine froze up.

This crew stands in front of their bomber which had a runaway prop which separated from the nacelle in World War II. Fortunately, it happened after landing. It severed the nose from the rest of the aircraft. No wonder the crew was worried about the runaway prop! (image from Squadron Signal publications)

The front end of the number 3 engine, note the oil! A Wright R-3350 is buried in there.

Note the oil on the exterior of the cowling. Also, the fact that the propeller reduction gear box has broken free of the engine is obvious in this photo.

More oil, notice the damaged flaps.

When the oil in number three was almost exhausted, Kellar ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. The altitude was 5,500 feet and speed was 170. The two scanners who rode in the rear, left via the rear entrance door, right scanner first, then left. The Radio operator, Navigator, and Engineer left via the entrance through the nose gear bay. The engineer went head first while the other two opted for a feet first exit. It was shortly after the crew bailed out that Wilbur, Washington was sighted through a hole in the clouds and cultivated fields nearby. The pilots decided to try to attempt a belly landing.

9989 rests in a wheat stubble field near Wilbur, Washington.

They had closed the nose gear doors and proceeded with a belly landing. Crash investigators described it as a very successful belly landing. According to Kellar, on approach to the chosen field, the vibration got very bad, and the RPMs bounced from 500 to 4000. Arnold stated that he had seen RPMs of over 4500. As they were making their final approach, number 3 was vibrating badly and beginning to freeze up. The landing was undoubtedly rough on the pilots, however, neither was injured. Both set about securing the aircraft by cutting off the magnetos to the remaining engines, disconnecting the batteries, and turning off the auxiliary engine to avoid the possibility of fire.

The hand drawn map in the accident report indicates that the ship came to a stop in about 150 feet. The aircraft was on a heading of 120 degrees, which is roughly South East. The map also indicates that there was some sort of road going north to south just west of the crash site. Wilbur is noted as being approximately 3 miles North East.

The causes for this accident are considered to be several, but all center around the propeller governor and feathering mechanism. Because of the damage upon landing, it was impossible to discern for certain. The oil pressure was lost to the propeller governor and it could not, therefore, control a constant RPM. The cause of this was assumed to be the rupture of a pressure oil line. The propeller governor gasket also failed and the remaining oil left via that failure. The gasket was considered to have failed because it was either a "shipping" gasket, or one of improper substitution.

One of the main issues was that the crew failed to make a test hop before leaving on their cross country ferry flight. This, coupled with no ground test of the feathering system and a cursory inspection of the aircraft before lift off was likely a recipe for the following crash.

Captain Moore, the Navigator, and S/Sgt. Schafer, the Right Scanner, were wounded after they jumped out. The rest were unharmed. It is assumed, due to the statements of the investigating board that 9989 was returned to flight status. She was removed from the field. It is assumed, also, that 9989 went on to protect American interests.

The land owner, August Rux, signed an affidavit confirming that he did not expect compensation for the damage done to his land. He noted that the only damage done was the road that led to the crash site, which would be fine, since he planned to plow over it in the spring anyway.

(Author's Note: I have sent off for the Aircraft History Card for this aircraft, and hope to receive it in the next month or so. I will add that information to this post when I get it, so please leave a comment and check the box for responses if you are interested, as I will post notification of the UPDATE there. Thank you for reading!)

Sources:

2 different Accident Reports from the USAF concerning B-29 #44-69989

Great Engines and Great Planes.

http://imperialclub.com/Yr/1945/47Planes/Cover.htm

Warner Robins AFB Wikipedia Entry

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warner_Robins,_Georgia

Warner Robins AFB Site

http://www.robins.af.mil/

B-29 Superfortress Wikipedia Entry

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-29_Superfortress

Birdsall, Steve, B-29 Superfortress in Action, Squadron Signal Publications, Carrollton, Texas, 1977.

Collison, Thomas, The Superfortress is Born; The Story of the Boeing B-29, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1945.

Wagner, Ray, American Combat Planes; Third Edition, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1982.

F-106A #59-142

During the Cold War, as I've written, there were, in a few places in Washington, Air Bases with interceptor squadrons assigned. A standard thing to do in the military is to train until an action becomes automatic. These interceptor squadrons were here for a few reasons. One was the presence of several War-Making industries (i.e., Hanford, Boeing, a few large naval bases, and any number of raw materials, like aluminum, wood products, and so on), the other was Washington's geographical placement. Washington is the first state on a route from the Soviet Union to other points in the USA (We don't claim singular status there, but you would get to us before you got to, say, Nevada on a flight from the Soviet Union).

Early training for interceptors usually involved a friendly bomber training for their own mission and the interceptor training for his and the two meeting up at some point. Ground control would vector the interceptor to a point where either the interceptor pilot (F-51s) or his on-board radar (F-94s,F-86s, F-89s, and finally F-106s) could track the incoming bomber on his own. Well, sometime in the late 1950s someone in the USAF decided to begin using the Martin B-57 Canberra to test the air defenses of the US. They decided to use the B-57 because of its size, range, speed, and altitude capability.

The B-57 did this, at first, without any special additions. No electronic gadgets or anything. But, as the interceptors got better at their jobs, the USAF decided to modify several RB-57As (R standing for reconnaissance)to do the job better. They added several black boxes and chaff dispensers and viola! they had a good target. These became part of Defense System Evaluation Squadrons. Eventually, though, B-57Bs and B-57Es were also modified accordingly. The EB-57s were used for many years to test the air defenses of the US. In fact, the last of the type to operate for the USAF were EB-57s, the last of which were retired in 1982.

The F-106 was basically an F-102 up-engined and integrated with a fire control system. The external differences between the two are easy for most to discern. The F-106's air intakes were moved behind the cockpit and the vertical stabilizer was chopped off compared to the F-102's. The first F-106 rolled off the assembly line in 1956. The last one was retired in 1988! Relatively unheard of, as compared to siblings like the F-104 and F-105, it stood guard at home while the others went off to war in Vietnam. Though, it did deploy to forward bases like Korea and Labrador (Though, one wonders how a TDY to Labrador, Canada compared to one to Korea).

Sometime during the afternoon of August 27, 1963, First Lieutenant Roger C. Axlund of the 498th FIS, began his flight planning routine for a night ECM/ECCM intercept training mission against an EB-57E (According to the accident report, it was a TB-57E, though the B-57 did not have a training variant. The B-57E had dual controls and was sometimes used for training and was hence designated a TB-57 in those instances. And some referred to it as a TB-57 at all times. Because it was being used as a defense system evaluator, it will be referred to as an EB-57 here.) temporarily deployed to McChord AFB, Washington from Hill AFB, Utah.

Lieutenant Axlund would likely have been taken out to his aircraft about an hour before launch. He was assigned to F-106A #59-142 and took off at 0005 on August 28, 1963, with two+ hours worth of fuel. The EB-57 had departed McChord AFB at five minutes before midnight with 4+ hours of fuel.

SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, a kind of Air Defense Ground Control) conducted the approach. Both the B-57 and the F-106 (Six) were in contact with the SAGE controller. The B-57 was communicating with voice comm, while the six was using a data-link (only mandatory safety and intercept calls were made by voice). Weather was clear, visibility was six miles in smoke.

The mission had been fully briefed between the crews of the Sixes and the B-57, since the ECM equipment in the EB-57 was new to the ADC training inventory. The B-57 turned on all of its jammers (four in number) until one of the generators failed, so the crew turned off the forward two jammers. This would be no problem since all of the attacks were expected to be from the aft quarters. There were two F-106s up conducting intercepts, alternating attacks. The B-57 maintained 250 KIAS (Knots Indicated Air Speed) and headings as directed by the SAGE controller.

Axlund called two successful attacks to the SAGE controller, even though there was non-standard language used. Axlund had reported no malfunctions or deficiencies. He made another visual contact on the B-57 and called separation on and visual contact with the other F-106. He then called a lock-on to the ECM jamming source. He en continued to attack the ECM Jamming source and collided with the B-57. The six's vertical stabilizer hit the B-57's number one engine (Left) and the six continued on from under the B-57's wing. The top 52 inches of the vetical stabilizer separated from the F-106.

The B-57 reported the collision to the SAGE controller and turned back toward McChord, about 95 miles East. The collision occurred at 0109 local, at 47 degrees 43 minutes N. , 124 degrees 45 minutes West. This was approximately 15 miles off shore, due West of Destruction Island, Washington.

Axlund was observed flying straight and level for about a mile, when he began a gentle left turn. He did not transmit after he reported the ECM lock-on. About three minutes prior to the collision. The UHF antenna was destroyed in the collision. The other F-106 had Axlund in sight and watched him begin and accelerated descent, seemingly stabilized on a heading toward shore. Axlund's aircraft began to pitch down and increased speed, in the opinion of the Six observing him, into the trans-sonic region. Somewhere under 20,000 feet, the observer saw a flash from Axlund's aircraft, which he took to be an ejection. Immediately after that, he lost radar an visual contact with Axlund's plane.

The B-57 returned to McChord safely. The crew was uninjured, though the pilot had to shut down his number one engine due to fire/overheat indications.

It appears, from this partial report, that Axlund was never located. One suspects wreckage from the aircraft was picked up, since the exact measurements of the lost vertical stabilizer appears to be known.

The track on the map that came with this partial report shows that the intercepts were conducted from the North Western tip of Washington down to about even with the Kalaloch area, where the collision occurred. The left and right elevons appear to have drifted quite a ways, having been located somewhere in the vicinity of Grays Harbor. The hand drawn map appears to have been copied several times and is of poor condition.

As ever, there seems to be very little information here. I know there is more out there. I would like to search newspapers from the era and area to see what they say, but my time and money are always in demand elsewhere. If ANY of you reader have something to add, PLEASE feel free to do so! Do it in a comment or e-mail me. I will do my best to publish it if you request it!

There are a few questions that rise here: What caused Axlund to misjudge the distance between him and the B-57? His aircraft was armed with training missiles. The F-106 had no guns, so getting THAT close to another aircraft when not refueling or flying formation seems unwise at best. Did Axlund suffer oxygen deprivation? Why else would he have gotten that close and not avoided a collision? There are several cases that support the stability of the Six in un-piloted flight, which would seem to support his not being conscious just prior to the collision.

You can see a picture and history of #59-0142 here.

Sources:

Accident report, electronic document, for #59-142.

B-57 Canberra In Action, Squadron Signal Publications. by Jim Mesko.

Welcome Home Mr. Speicher, Still Looking For #41-38253!

Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher is home. Shot down during combat, Captain Speicher's remains have been identified. He was among the first wave of the Desert Storm Air War, shot down on January 17, 1991. You can find the article here: http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=47359

It is good that we never give up the search. So many never came home. Which brings me to the P-39 that disappeared on December 9, 1942 and has never been found.

On Decemeber 9, 1942, 2nd Lieutenant Lewis M. Russel taxied his P-39D, #41-38253, out to the main runway and gunned his engine. He took off into the low overcast for a local training mission. At 1000 feet he would have entered the overcast. He had two (2) hours of fuel. He was a member of the 77th Fighter Squadron of the 20th fighter group, assigned to Paine Field, Washington. He never checked back in.

EVER.

Patrols and search parties were sent out over the next few weeks. As of the 28th of December, the weather had restricted the search. On December 30, the search was abandoned.

No one has reported finding his aircraft or his remains. The P-39D had a maximum speed of 360 MPH at 15000 feet. The accident report states that he had 2 hours of fuel. One wonders whether this was two hours at full throttle (Doubtful) or at some other specified regime of fuel management. Since it seems unlikely the pilot held it at full speed, one must search closer than 720 miles from Paine Field. The range on the 145 gallon internal fuel was 1100 miles at 196 MPH. One suspects the "Two hour" supply is not the best measurement of fuel on board. Still, 2 hours at 196MPH is just under 400 miles.

Neither 720, nor 400 miles seems likely. Paine Field is just North of Seattle and lies just a few feet above sea level. On one side is the Puget Sound, on the other is a range of mountains called the Cascades. Peaks of 5000 feet lie within 20 miles. With the overcast sitting at 1000 feet, the most likely course of events seems to be 2nd LT. Russel took off for a local flight and when he broke into the overcast lost his way. It seems completely possible that he lost his bearings and perhaps was so disoriented his aircraft fell out of the sky in a stall. If he came down in the Sound...well, we will have to wait for Mr. Robert Ballard to look for him with his mini-subs. On the other hand, given its wintery loss, it could remain in the hills and mountains near Paine Field.

Where is P-39D #41-38253? We may never know, but we can hope 2nd LT. Russel one day finds his way home.

NOTE:
February 6, 2010:  I recently got an e-mail that indicates that this aircraft has indeed been located.  One assumes Lt. Russel eventually found his way home.  It appears it was located as early as 1957.  

F-104C #57-912, May 10, 1963

(the F-104D at McClellan Aviation Museum, now Aerospace Museum of California)

On May 10, 1963, (46 years ago today) Captain Victor J. O'Bryan strapped on an F-104C Starfighter for a Napalm and Strafe mission at the Yakima Firing Center. O'Bryan was part of a vast aerial armada that had been moved to the central part of Washington State for Exercise Coulee Crest. This exercise was designed to test the smooth cooperation of the different service branches. Captain O'Bryan was part of the 479th Tacticl Fighter Wing, and the 435th Tactical Fighter Squadron from George AFB. His aircraft would not last the day.

The mission was to rendezvous with an F-100F over the range in Central Washington and have the flight photographed on it's firing passes which would be coordinated by a Forward Air Controller (FAC). Weather was 4000 scattered, high thin scattered, visibilty was 15 miles and the temperature was 60 F. The wind was five miles an hour. The flight consisted of 4 F-104C Starfighters, made by Lockheed for the Tactical Air Command. O'Bryan was the number three man.

Why a thoroughbred fighter plane like the F-104 should be forced to carry bombs and troll around in the mud is beyond me. The F-104 did one thing very well. It went very fast. It was tiny. The cockpit is not far above the ground, in a pinch you could probably get into the cockpit without the benefit of a ladder. It was about 54 feet long with a miniscule wingspan of only 21 feet. Those wings had sharp edges and had special covers so ground crews would not injur themselves while walking around the plane (See photo below). It was difficult to find in the sky and it was very fast. It had one very powerful engine, the J-79, also used on the F-4 Phantom. The C model of the F-104 had a new model of the J-79, its diameter was three inches bigger, giving it about 1000 more pounds of thrust. However, "The F-104C had a number of operational problems with various components. The major offender was the J79-GE-7 engine--forty serious mishaps occurred over a five-year period, destroying 24 aircraft and killing 9 pilots. This led to Project Seven Up, a General Electric modification program for the engine which began in May of 1963 and ended in June of 1964. "* Still, the F-104 could deliver its small payload with devestating accuracy according to most sources.

The flight's call sign was Ritzy. The preflight had stressed safety procedures concerning the armament. The report states that the armorer noted nothing out of the ordinairy during the arming of the gun. Even another pilot from the flight had checked his gun door and felt that it was secure.

The flight took off at 1005 PDT and proceeded to the target area where they contacted Friend X-ray, their FAC. The F-100, call sign Boil 64, joined the formation on the wing of number four at this time. The FAC directed the flight to the target, 55 gallon drums and cardboard troop cut outs. The flight dropped its napalm on the first pass. They then went around for a gunnery pass. O'Bryan did not fire on the first pass because of the smoke from the napalm. At this time, Boil 64 lost his position on the number four aircraft and formed up on O'Bryan's wing for his second strafing pass. At about 2500 feet from the target, O'Bryan opened fire. He had only fired about 100 rounds when he felt a jolt in the aircraft and heard a grinding noise as the gun stopped firing.

O'Bryan interpreted this as a gun jam and initiated a pull up at 100% power when Boil 64 told him a part of his aircraft had just come off. O'Bryan asked him to check out his aircraft and left his power at 100%. Boil 64 indicated that O'Bryan's gunbay door was missing. There was also a hole at the bottom rear of the gun compartment, at this time, O'Bryan began to notice the engine running rugged. His instruments read 700 degrees EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature), 70% RPM. The aircraft peaked out of the climb at 6000 feet and 240KIAS (Knots Indicated Air Speed) and began a gentle descent. O'Bryan attempted a low-altitude stall clearing procedure. While he was doing this Boil 64 could not slow down enough to stay with him. The procedure worked and RPM increased to 90%, but then the engine stalled again, but more violently than before. His altitude was 4000 and O'Bryan decided it was best to leave the aircraft. He leveled out at 200KIAS. His radio had not come back on line after the stall clearing procedure.

He jettisoned the canopy, and ejected successfully. Pilot and seat separated, but the automatic chute opening system malfunctioned and he had to pull the manual lanyard. He landed safely and was picked up by helicopter within a half hour. The aircraft impacted approximately 14 miles NE of Yakima, Washington. The price of the aircraft is listed as $1,478,402.00.

.

It would appear from the report that there was an explosion of gun exhaust gas, which compromised the gun bay door. It would appear, also, that parts from this explosion were possibly ingested by the engine, which caused the stall. Given the F-104's poor slow speed handling and the fact that it had the glide angle of a brick with wings, it was probably a good idea to depart the aircraft.

below are pictures of the engine. It appears to have wrapped itself up.


here is a map of the crash area.

*http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f104_9.html

Pasco F-106 #57-2489 *update #2*

Contiuning with the F-106 theme, I have here one that went down much closer to my home than the others. Still, as with the other F-106 reports, it leaves much to be desired. This report has only 2 pages plus a map and a photo.

On Tuesday, March 19, 1963, (at about 1712Z or zulu, which would be 9:12am local, because PST is Zulu -8) an F-106 on a local training mission came down about 5 miles south of Pasco, Washington. Its pilot had reported control problems.

Earlier that morning, Captain William F. Tesmer and Lieutenant Donld L. Hatcher briefed for a local training mission. Expected takeoff time was 1615Z, however, their flight was scrambled early at 1557Z(7:57am local). Tesmer's callsign for the mission was AH06 and Hatcher's was AH05. At this time, AH06 reported "dolly in valid." This phrase is not familiar, so could be reference to some ground control point with that call sign, or perhaps he was reporting that his automated guidance/data link was faulty. The latter seems to be supported, though: Three voice intercepts were completed against SAC target Y209 (Again, probably a B-52 from a local base). The results were three "MA's" (Mission Accomplished?) for three attempts. AH05 then completed two data link passes. The first pairing for AH06 was at 1612Z and the last was at 1647Z. The last intercept was completed about 200NM southwest of Geiger Field.

At this time AH05 had 4800 pounds of fuel and AH06 had 6400. AH05 had gone supersonic, which acounted for the difference. Both were returning to base (RTB) at Geiger. AH06 was 12 miles in trail of AH05 at 40,000 feet. AH06 called tallyho on AH05 (meaning he had picked him up visually) and said he would make a pass on AH05 on the way back to Geiger. At 1657Z AH06 transmitted MAYDAY at GEORFF position DRQA5049. (I would sure love to know how this navigation system works)

AH05 stated that, to his knowledge, AH06's intercepts had been completely normal until his breakaway maneuver had begun. AH06 overtook AH06 on the starboard side "began a medium back turn to the left, passing directly overhead." Ah06 transmitted that his "flight controls are frozen" and requested that AH05 follow him. At this time AH05 estimated AH06's mach to be 1.3 or 1.4. AH06 suggested that his "vari-ramps have possibly not returned to their normal position" and "'there is no light on' (vari-ramp), indicating that he was at a supersonic speed sufficient to actuate the vari-ramps." (the vari-ramps would appear to be the F-106 version of a variable inlet. As airspeed increases, engineers have found that it is desirable to alter the flow of air into a jet engine to keep the incoming air subsonic, despite the speed of the aircraft. This is usually done by changing the inlet shape or placing baffles in the inlet. Different designers found different ways of doing the same thing, for example, on the SR-71, there was a movable cone that went forward or aft in front of the engine, according to the airspeed. for more information see this NASA site.)

AH05 observed AH06 perform two tight barrel rolls to the left and then stabilize into a shallow left turn. AH05 joined AH06 for the completion of a 360 degree turn. AH06 had descended from 40,000 feet to about 33,000 feet. At 29,000 feet AH05 lost visual contact with AH06 in the clouds. During the 360 degree turn, AH06 reported that "it fees as though it's stuck in flight mode; the trim button has no effect; I can only maintain 160-170 knots." After he entered the cloud deck, there is no more transcripts of the pilot's transmissions on this report, though, apparently, the "Tab U transcript" has more.

Captain Tesmer reported that he was ejecting at 1712Z. The crash occured sometime between 1712Z and 1719Z. Eye witnesses stated that the aircraft passed the east edge of Pasco on a SSE heading at about 1000 feet altitude. They observed the aircraft pull up as it approached rising terrain south of Kennewick, Washington. As it pulled up, an object, probably the canopy, came off the aircraft. "A few seconds later they observed a bright flash, smoke, dust, and heard a loud muffled explosion."

The accident was fatal for Captain Tesmer, though there are no details explaining how. It does not say where the body/ejection seat was found, nor does it offer any other details tht would flesh out this story.

The map appears to show the impact somewhere near Jump Off Joe, a peak of 2200 feet. Not too far from the Nine Canyon Wind Project. The photo shows the crash to be on plowed land. It seems unlikely, however, that there would be any remnants after 45 years of tillings.

The flight path shows the two aircraft came from the west over the Horse Heaen Hills, about half way between the Yakima Valley and the Columbia River. Tesmer is shown as descending to 28,000 feet above Badger, Washington. A few miles later, almost over the impact area, contact was lost with him at 16,000 feet. From here it seems he made a wide descending turn to the left to end up where he did. It would seem to me that Captain Tesmer could have jumped out earlier, but he chose to ride his mount and keep it under control as best he could. Was this to find a spot to land this high speed aircraft with a high landing speed(unlikely)? Or was this to make sure his aircraft did not come down on a populated area? It seems doubtful we will ever know for sure.

Additionally, it is interesting that F-106 #57-2489 is shown in at least one source as going down some 30 miles further to the south near Hermiston, Oregon instead of its official USAF position on the same date.

*UPDATES* (Many thanks to Gene Gould for his time in the local library) Here is some added information.
1. The crater left by the aircraft was about 20X30 feet and 6 feet deep.
2. The pilot, Tesmer, was a graduate of Ohio University.
3. He served 3 1/2 years in Japan before transfer to Geiger.
4. He was survived by his wife and two children(ages 1 and 4). His parents, too lost a son, they lived in Shaker Heights, Ohio.
5. Tesmer, according to the paper, did NOT eject. While the report did not say that he did, it did not say he did NOT eject. The popping of the canopy seemed to indicate he had, though, and given early F-106 dificulties with the ejection seat, I had wrongly assumed it was to be blamed.
6. The paper confirmed the assumption that Tesmer had likely stayed with the aircraft to avoid populated areas.

*UPDATE # 2*
After some emails and a little patience, a fuller story has come to be revealed. these are the additional details:

1. The aircraft appeared to strike the ground nearly vertically.
2. Despite the fact that the canopy was found about 2 1/2 miles NNW of the crash site, the pilot's "body had remained with the aircraft upon impact." The report blamed a malfunction of the seat as most likely. The F-106 had ejection seat difficulties early on.
3. Preliminary results indicated the there had been a loss of control or near loss of control.
4. The aircraft struck at a high speed or a high thrust, given the depth of the hole.
5. The remains of the aircraft were sifted through a screen and layed out in a hangar at Spokane Airport. the report basically suggests that all remnants were removed.
6. The report further suggests that maintenance forms and records were not kept.
7. The committee suggested that a steering/control problem had occured.

While this does not say much more than the library article and the original accident report, it does add a little to what we know. Hopefully this is the last update necessary, however, if you have any personal relation to the airplane, please leave a comment or drop me an email.

F-106 Troubles 1, #57-2484

I recently obtained a few F-106 accident reports from the early 1960s. These F-106s were assigned to the Spokane International Airport.

During the Cold War, and today, really, fighter squadrons were and are stationed around the United States with the intention that they would be able to intercept incoming bombers or other threats. The F-106s (retired in 1988) were assigned to the ADC, or Air Defense Command. The reports are not complete, in that little mention is made of blame or final solution. With that in mind, I am offering my best interpretations. If someone out there finds my suppositions to be false or you have a better description, by all means please e-mail me and I will make necessary corrections. Here is the first report.

On the morning of September 14, 1961, First Lieutenant Russell C. Wood briefed for a routine target mission. This would likely have been an intercept of a B-52 training in the area. Given the location of SAC bases, the B-52 could have been from Larson AFB, Fairchild AFB, or any number of other bases in the Northwest (Idaho, Montanna...etc.). It could have also been an intercept of an EB-57 , which was used to test the Air Defenses of the Continental US, though, I believe that to be unlikely. From what I understand the EB-57s were used for training and checking the radar systems and operators, not necessarily the ADC fighters.

Airman second class Kenneth D. Hintz accompanied Wood on his walk around of F-106A #57-2484. There were no discrepancies and Hintz secured the access panels while Wood strapped in. One combustion start was attempted with no success, but a pneumatic start worked at 0915. The MA-1 power system timed in and they made various checks, then Wood taxied to the ramp. He was airborne a 0926, 6 minutes after the proposed time. Estimated fuel onboard was 8900 pounds.

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Wood made a left turn out of traffic and began his climb on a heading of 326. The proposed flight plan was "Geiger direct 52 degrees N. 122 degrees W. (William's Lake B.C.) direct Larson TACAN, direct Spokane VORTAC." That looks like a trip to the North East to British Columbia, a turn to the South West back to Larson, then a turn to the East to end up back at Spokane. The F-106 on the same flight profile and plan 1/2 hour behind heard his check-ins via radio, but no ground stations did.

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It was not until he was over the Larson TACAN at 1038 at FL480 (48,000 feet) that Spokan Center heard from him. He then contacted Spokane Approach Control and was positively identified on radar (No difficult feat considering there probably were not many other aircraft at FL480) and "he was cleared to the 35 mile fix of the Spokane VORTAC, report inbound." (VORTAC stands for: VHF Omnidirectional Range/Tactical Aircraft Control)

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He reported over the fix at FL200. He was instructed to report once he passed FL70. At 24 miles he was advised of traffic, a DC-6, at 14 miles West of VORTAC. At 15 miles he was dvised to begin his landing cockpit check. He reported when he passed through 7000 feet, and requested a "surveillance approach to runway 03." He was told to level off at 4000 feet and he acknowledged. Again he was advised of traffic, and told to "prepare to start his descent in 4 miles."

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He then told RAPCON (Radar Approach Control) that he would have to break off this approach, but they did not respond. He continued his pproach, then was told to start his descent. Twelve seconds later he was told to maintain 4000 feet and turn right to 150 because of traffic. He reported steady on 150, and then was told to turn to 205 and maintain 4000. 30 seconds later the tower observd him continue turning past 205. They asked if he was continuing this appoach on his own, to which he replied, "Negative, I would like a surveillance approach to runway 03." They told him to stop his turn and then proceeded to give him a "no-gyro" approach. At 5 miles he was told to begin his descet. Radar contact was lost at three miles, which was normal considering ground clutter.

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The aircraft crashed 2.4 miles from the runway on a heading of 063 degrees true. The smoke was observed from Spokane Tower at 1102. Wood ejected, but unsuccessfully from an altitude of 200-500 feet above the ground.

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The report ends with the summation that there was no indication of emergency from Wood. It does not state what caused the crash. It does not go into anything else. Simply the flight description. This, in the my world of aircraft accident reports, is annoying, since others generally have a page where a determination of cause is surmised if it isn't known.

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As an unqualified observer from almost 50 years on, I offer my supposition that it may have been possible for his J-75 to flame out. I don't know what would have caused a flame-out, though. Perhaps he retarded the fuel flow for a moment or there was a stuck valve. Did he suffer a bird strike? Until the rest of the report is released or someone comes forward with a better idea, that is what we are left with.

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The picture of the crash site and this ground track are all that is included with this report. On the map you can make out the B-52 and KC-135 shapes to the left where Fairchild is, and the F-106 and civil aircraft shapes at Spokane International.

Note: On 30 August 1956 the Air Coordinating Committee approved a common military-civil short-range air navigation system called VORTAC, which combined TACAN with the Civil Aeronautic Authority's very high frequency omnirange direction finder. see link at left.

Note: TACAN stands for Tactical Air Navigation. see wikipedia link at left.